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Preface 1: A Note Before The Formal Writing Begins

The first words put to paper in the pursuit of this project are an apology. The very point
the work strives to prove is self defeating; its linguistic form assures that, by its own goalposts, it
will fail. It contains a certain and necessary aporia, a paper about the failure of communication
by words made entirely of communication by words! However, hope is not lost! I can provide
two partial remedies at this point of the process, a point that holds a unique importance. First, I
find it important to create a certain distance between my gesture and the object it points towards.
Just as Socrates did not describe The Good, but rather gestured towards something related, I
make no claim towards putting my finger on the pulse of something True. Rather, I choose to
point towards something I believe has value. Second, Nietzsche said in the preface to The Birth
Of Tragedy titled “An Attempt At Self Criticism” , that his only regret is that he spoke the work
when he “should have sung” it instead (5). should have, instead, sung it. He wished that he had
not verbalized it formally, but made it musical and artistic. I intend, in lieu of a major switch in
academic focus, to conceptualize this writing process as a dance. If—perhaps—language can be
choreographed instead of scripted, then maybe (and truly just maybe) we can avoid some of the
trappings and failings of language. We shall forsake putting our thinkers into conversation (it
would be a very frustrated conversation between them anyway) and, in its place, have them share
a dance, fluid and artful. Of course, all of that carries tremendous uncertainty: can one even
dance with words? If they can, can I do so? And even if I can, would it help create some, even
the smallest space, within language to create something more effective? To each question, and
the many more that go unmentioned, I respond with resounding unsuredness! However, if I
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confuse not knowing with never knowing then the battle is already lost and the attempt deserted.
So, let us progress into an unknown that will answer some of our questions, for a gesture at
something from a distance is certainly preferable to leaving it undisturbed, is it not?
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Preface 2: A Note Before The Formal Writing Continues

Hello again! For you it has only been moments since we first made our acquaintance, but
for me it has been months. So, as a favor to me, entertain my warm rewelcoming, it is a pleasure
to see you. I write to you from the approximate midway point in this project and, as such, think
it’s appropriate to reevaluate and reorient our journey together. It is not my place to make
substantive changes to the previous note, doing so would be dishonest, therefore I will take this
space to pontificate freely towards the end of which I dream. Since I wrote the first note, we have
turned away from a project about how words fail, as I so confidently put to paper. I do not seek
to land at a conclusion of any failure, much less on the part of words (words, of course, are our
creation afterall). Instead, the ‘failure’ that I wrote of will be removed from its teleological
pedestal. It is not that words are supposed to accomplish a certain thing, at which they fail.
Rather, I will be trying to show that we employ language for a task that it simply does not have
the qualities to complete. We cannot place the blame of such a thing on the words! If I tried to
build a house out of straw and a proverbial big (perhaps also bad) wolf came and blew it down,
then the straw would not be culpable for my now defunct home. I should have just built the
house out of bricks in the first place! Straw is great for many things (although as I write I realize
I may not know what straw is, in fact, used for), but building houses happens to not be one of
them. Just the same, words lend themselves to much utility and beauty; exact explanation of the
interior, as you’ll hopefully soon find out, just so happens to not be one of them. To work
through that premise, we will structure our investigation in the same order as the journey of
words, directionally towards the outside. We’ll do so to a certain end, for we can be teleological
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in our journey. Are words the best we can do? Is there not something better, something more
accurate, something more honest, something more beautiful? I won’t spoil anything, nor could I
if i wanted to! For the time being, let us speak together towards silence.

5

Dear Reader,

My Zayde was a fighter pilot in the Second World War. He and my grandmother married
in 1940, the year before the US joined the war. While he was training in a barrack in Alabama,
my grandmother, Doris Zaslow, would visit him from her home in the Bronx when she had the
chance. After one such trip she wrote in a letter to him, “how can I tell you all that I feel….there
is a wordless wild cadence of music in my heart and mind at the thought of you and the last
days… It pours and eddies to my fingertips…making me bow my head with awe.” What
beautiful writing and magical thought. In my grandmother’s words, we find the tension that we
seek to explore and, perhaps, even relieve. She seeks a way to express the powerful love that she
feels for him. Her description of the feeling warrants repetition, “a wordless wild cadence of
music.” Yet, despite the wordlessness of the feeling, it “eddies to [her] fingertips,” readily placed
on the typewriter and prepared to receive instruction for word. It seems to me that the awe that
she describes is produced by the tension between the wordlessness of feeling and the worded
expression. She is driven by a sense that she must try to share how she feels, it is not optional.
However, her only outlet for sharing does not elicit an expression that fulfills that need, at least
not fully. It is this very problem that we intend on exploring. This is a project that begins with the
internal, but it makes no claims to reside there. Instead, it strives for a dynamism that begins
within and moves into the world of connection. If it so happens that we pay close enough
attention to what we find, then, by the closing of this project we may uncover some new
instructions, new guiding thoughts on how best to connect.

6

I’ve chosen to write in the form of a letter, modeled off the letter that we began with. I
intend it to be read as such. The formality of a traditional philosophical essay does not lend itself
to our exploration. In its place I wish for the intimacy of a letter between dear old friends. I’d
like to share with you as best as I can, though it will certainly not be complete. The form of a
letter does not entail a lack of rigor, per se, but an understanding that it is a necessarily human
expression. It does not strive for the emotionless logic of traditional philosophical argument. I
will not go as far as to declare such writing sophistry, as Socrates did in The Apology. However,
it would not serve our, or perhaps just my, purposes. We require the warmth of a letter.
Throughout the work I will digress from the topic at hand in short labeled spurts, ranging
from entirely informal to, shall we say, business casual. I intend for these digressions to function
in much the same way as educational signage on a hike to a beautiful vista. Let’s say the sign
tells of all the different species of lizards that live on the mountain. The main focus of the hike is
the payoff of the view, but the signage may provide additional information to ground you, the
hiker, in the historical and natural context of the land’s ecology. You can then choose to
incorporate the signage into your experience or not. I place the signs along our hike together
because I believe that they will enrich the work, but are not necessary to it, and, on the off
chance you happen to see a lizard.
Allow me, then, to brief you on the itinerary of our hike. First, we will explore why it is
that language is not a sufficient form of expression. That exploration begins with an examination
of human interiority. We will work with the interior as a private space, one that cannot be so
neatly divided up and distributed. That will lead us towards questions of honesty. We will then
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follow that into an analysis of the specific and its appearance, or lack thereof, in communication.
That will, in turn, bring us to the breaching of the role of the other in the process of expression.
First using Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘sovereign man’ and ‘conscience’ and imposing Jacques
Lacan’s ‘mirror stage,’ we will understand a system of the internalization of the gaze of the other.
That understanding will seek to unpack the dialectical identification with the other as an
independent phenomenon. Although that inquiry will not be exhaustive, we will attempt to come
to an understanding of the role an internalized other plays in our experience of the world. That
will, then, return us to our question of language. We will work through language as a mechanism
of internalizing the other through Nietzsche’s work in The Gay Science. We will eventually
arrive at an understanding of linguistic self expression as insufficient and corrupting of the
individual, the expression itself, and the connection it attempts to form.
Second, we will imagine an outside of linguistic expression, what else is there that can
express a “wordless and wild cadence?” This section of the project will be less tethered to
argument and will, in its place, be based in imagination. It will ask the questions: how can we
reorient our conception of expression? and how can we mobilize that to best connect? We will
examine three case studies: automatic writing, jazz, and Contact Improvisation. These are
intended to provide a loose guide to our process. They will help us to new understandings of
communication and expression, but will not, themselves, be final. This segment, and therefore
the project as a whole, does not intend to be terminal. Instead, it looks forward and seeks to elicit
a next step, whether that be more academic work, personal exploration, or another category
outside of my imagination. More than anything, it wishes to brand a question into the heart of the
reader: how can I connect with others more wholly, more personally, and with more honesty?
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The part of an answer I come to in the pages that will follow is a gesture towards a maybe. By
the expectations of a logical argument seeking truth, expectations often held by the academy, I
will fail. That matrix wishes for a sturdy building, built to completion. I, instead, am attempting
to build scaffolding for you, my reader, to build your own building. I have no say in that step of
the process. I merely hope my scaffolding is sturdy enough to support you.
Return, with me, briefly to the letter with which we opened. My grandmother concludes
by writing “good bye now darling…be well and of good cheer…and if you look about you
carefully tonight…..after you’re dismissed…you’ll see me waiting for you…sitting on the
wooden benches half hidden in that little clump of trees beyond and below your
barracks….waiting with outstretched hand……” Once again, we are guided by her letter towards
an end. She is writing to him because she has no other means of communicating. However, she
writes a dream, one in which not a word is spoken between the two. In silence she waits for him
and in silence she reaches out for him. We can only imagine that in silence he embraces her
waiting hand. She concludes with six consecutive dots, an extended ellipsis. It is as if she is
gesturing beyond the language of her letter, pointing towards a silent unknown. The following 50
some odd pages will seek to accomplish what my grandmother did in a mere two. We will begin,
as she did, in the exploration of real phenomena. For her, it was the description of the love they
shared. For us, less excitingly, it is the unpacking of modalities of expression. Then, as she did,
we will conclude in an imaginary, begging the question of how best to stretch our hand to each
other. I will be arguing that language, as an attempt to place the necessarily private internal world
into the modality of the other, is alienating to both the speaker and the connection they seek to
form using words. I will then be imagining different modes of expression, and perhaps we can
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find the seed of a beautiful new connection, a new communication, in which we dance together,
hand in hand and wordless.
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The Personal Interior
Our hike begins with a spatial focusing towards the interior. That focus will take us into a
viewing—a fleshing out, so to speak—of the human inner world and its properties. What will not
be given is a definition of the specifics of that world, such a thing would be somewhere from
impossible to outside the scope of this work. My intentions, in the following pages, are specific:
to cordon off the interior as a private space of its own, to gesture towards what makes it unique
and necessary, and to begin the work of establishing its nature apropos language. Let’s slow
down for a moment, what do I mean when I say interior and what about its unshareable nature?
By interior I mean, in the simplest terms, the inner life of the human, the expansive world of
feelings, thoughts, and indescribable little occurrences that make up the intramural area. I am
seeking to establish that interior as fundamentally unable to be specifically shared, that is without
loss, dishonesty, or inaccuracy. How, then, can we understand and demonstrate its individual and
unshareable nature?
Allow me to posit the classic example of pain. If you and I are both stabbed in the arm
what are the relations and similarities of our pain? We will unpack two entwined facts that will
aid us in reaching insight. First, we can never know, for certain, that our experience is the same,
or even similar. Any description we can assign to our pains is necessarily relative and anything
specific and objective remains out of our reach. Even if you and I were stabbed in the same
place, with the same weapon, and in the same way there is no possible means by which we can
discern each other's pains specifically. I could tell you that my pain is ‘sharp and searing’ and
you could concur, but what do those words mean to each of us? They are relative to experience.
What is sharp to me may be what you experience as dull, we simply cannot know. Second, and
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derivative of the first fact, our pains are fundamentally unshareable. I cannot, no matter my wish,
extract my pain and bestow it to you. This is a point that, in a certain way, is so base that it
becomes difficult to express. You may think I am speaking figuratively, that I am saying I cannot
describe my pain in such a way that it is as if I am extracting it to give to you. In fact, I am being
quite literal. My pain is mine to experience and nobody else's. Description can never stand in
place of experience. Despite our similarity in injury, you cannot feel the physical pain of my stab
wound and I cannot feel yours. Perhaps we also react differently on an emotional level to our
identical injuries. I may be incited to anger, whereas you may be incited to fear. What, then, is so
different in our experiences such that our identical external injury so differently affects our
internal world? We can then ascertain that experiences of pain, as phenomena of the interior, are
essentially personal. I cannot describe them in ways that are nonrelative and I cannot extricate
the sensations themselves. Any attempt I make to export their contents in the form of the
specific, whole and unaltered, is one that fails before it even begins. The impossibility of does
not narrowly apply to stab wounds, horrible pain, and other such outliers. In fact, there are no
experiences of the interior that are exempt from this principle. Ranging from extremes of pain,
mourning, and love to the most quotidian feelings of boredom, annoyance, or happiness, the
entire spectrum of the interior is unchangeably personal in its specifics.
You will notice here that my language is exact. I am not saying that, simply, the interior
cannot be shared, point blank. I am saying it cannot be shared in specific and exact form. I
cannot describe exactly what is going on inside, such that you understand completely. Yet, I can
share in some capacity, perhaps even with some success. As we’ll get into below, we often
communicate our interiors poorly to a specific and actionable end. I could say “I’m in a good
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mood and want to dance” and you’ll come dancing with me, despite not understanding exactly
what my mood means. If I wish to share that with you in a precise and holistic way, I will have
failed. I cannot communicate in exact terms, and, of course, cannot extricate the feeling.
However, I have brought myself joy by communicating to an end, not for the sake of being
understood.
In his famed 1974 essay “What Is It Like To Be A Bat?”, philosopher Thomas Nagel
poses the titular question, begging the grander question of what the experience of being
something other than you is like. We’ll turn to his essay for guidance and a framing that will aid
our discussion of interiority. Nagel writes that “the essence of the belief that bats have experience
is that there is something that it is like to be a bat” (438). We must presume that the fact that bats
experience the world, in one way or another, is derivative of the fact that being a bat is, itself, a
certain kind of being. Trying to understand what that kind of being is like turns out to be a
difficult task because “our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination,
whose range is therefore limited. It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's
arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth” (439).
Our imagination is limited to our life-world, and therefore we are able to imagine “what it would
be like for [us] to behave as a bat behaves” but not “what it is like for a bat to be a bat” (439). We
cannot imagine ourselves within the lived experience of a bat. Therefore, the answer to his
original question is certainly something, but not a something that we can imagine. As Nagel
describes, “reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion
that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human
language” (441). He extrapolites that to the theoretical, writing “we cannot form more than a
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schematic conception of what it is like [...] these experiences also have in each case a specific
subjective character, which it is beyond our ability to conceive” (439). The capability to ascertain
what it’s like to be or feel something is limited to the subjective, never crossing the final
boundary of objectivity.
I’d like to make a quick note here. One could read the binary distinctions I make and
think I am aiming for some form of Cartesian dualism in which there is a metaphysical wall
between the self and the physical world. With all of this speak of cordoning off the interior as
private, you’d surely be understood for thinking so. However, I assure you I am doing no such
thing. I am working phenomenologically and making no claims towards a universal metaphysics.
That is to say, I am not pointing towards a general law of separation between the interior and the
exterior. There are no claims being made that there is I and there is world and that they are
ontologically and fundamentally separate. Instead, I am claiming that there are certain
experiences of I that are personal and cannot be wholly shared outside of the self. There is, of
course, much exchange between the worlds of the exterior and the interior, through attempts at
self expression and intake of sensory information. We are unconcerned with making a statement
on the latter category; the scope of this work begins and ends with those gestures at self
expression.

______________________________________________________________________________
A Digression On The Interior Itself
Oh how I wish that our problem were this simple. If I were to simply establish here that
our interior is fundamentally unshareable, as I’ve gestured to above, that we attempt to share it

14

anyway with words, as I will below, and that this disharmony causes great dissonance, then our
work would be easy. This is, of course, untrue; nothing in this discipline is ever quite so easy, but
perhaps we may call this problem straightforward. However, we do not seek to merely prove the
alienation that words bring. Instead, we take our problem as a calling to something beyond that.
This inquiry is not into the failure wrought by language; it is on the potential for communication
and connection. Perhaps our interior is incomplete itself. Perhaps it needs to reach out and
express itself in order to be completed. Here we offer an olive branch to the Hegalians and the
extroverts. A savvy reader could interpret the unfinished existence that I am framing as a tragic
one. One in which an interior requires a completion that it cannot achieve. I am, however, not a
savvy writer. I write this because I believe that our relations to each other and ourselves are not
doomed, just sometimes misguided. That there is some completion and beauty to be found.
These could be the mutterings under the breath of a romantic lost in a wish, or they could, less
elegantly, be flat out wrong. I don’t concern myself with questions such as those.
______________________________________________________________________________

Part of the problem towards which I am pointing is a lack of honesty. If I purport to share
my interior world with you in specific, I am compromising my honesty. I assure you, this is not
an ethical judgment, but a practical one. If I am being dishonest, then we are not really
communicating anything at all. When I tell you ‘I am feeling melancholy,’ I am misleading you.
Perhaps this is the closest word, and the nearest match, but, fundamentally, I am making sure that
we are on uneven terms. You believe I am feeling specifically melancholy, and I am, of course,
not. When I tell you that I am, I tell you a lie. I’m using the word ‘melancholy’ to describe a
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feeling that may resemble it, but my feeling is entirely unique. It is similar to the generally
understood definition of melancholy, but not a match. Here you may have three basic issues with
the premise. First, you may think it’s ‘close enough.’ We have a tacit understanding that when we
speak we are not being literal or exact and that we are approximating. That we understand,
implicitly or explicitly, that our language is not precise seems evident from the search for a
‘best-word’ that we often undertake, the grasping at approximation of a writer looking for a
synonym, a friend looking to console, or a lover trying to express their feelings. We understand,
at least partially, that with our words we simply do our best. Of course, that is not entirely true;
much language seems to strive for exactness as if it were possible, but for our purposes it is true
enough. Our second concern is that our lack of exactness and our misunderstanding simply do
not matter. Here we don the hat of a pragmatist. It seems certainly true that a sentence like “I’m
feeling melancholy” serves quite a lot of use, even if it is not perfectly communicative. It could
spur a listener to deliver chocolates, give a hug, or offer support. It is not a holistic and specific
expression, but it serves a purpose towards action. Finally, the third potential counter is that, with
a slight semantic change, we could resolve this problem. If I were to say “I’m feeling something
like melancholy” then it seems as if I have restored my honesty. I am now explicitly working
from a model that sees language as that which fits best, not as final and definitive. I have
managed to circumvent my dishonesty with a small disclaimer, merely two words: “something
like.”
Here you may have noticed these counter arguments are more convincing, even to me,
than the original argument of honesty. That is no mistake, nor is it a worry. The strength of the
counter arguments would be a devastating turn of events if it were the case that the crux of this
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project relies on honesty, on a true and pure expression. Fortunately for us it does not! Our
problem is not dishonesty of the interior. Our foray into honesty, then, is a stop along the way,
but not our final destination. We must understand, before going forward, the fact of dishonesty
when attempting to express the internal in the form of the specific and objective. Even if that is
not what haunts our critique of linguistic expression. It is a building block to what does. We must
understand that if one tries to express specifically and completely they will always be dishonest.
It is not impossible to speak with candor, but there is no way of being honest while being exact.
Any attempt towards exactness is distorted and disrupted.
Here we arrive at the core of our premise, one that we have repeated more than once. Our
interior worlds are necessarily personal; they do not possess the capability to be split and
externalized. Nietzsche, in a notebook entry published posthumously in the 10th volume of the
Nachgelassene Fragmente 1869 - 1874: Kritische Studienausgabe, writes that “there is a false
saying: ‘How can someone who can’t save himself save others?’ Supposing I have the key to
your chains, why should your lock and my lock be the same?” (4). This passage contains an
important insight to drive our point home. Nietzsche is referring to a basic lived truth of
ontological difference: the locks on our chains must be different. Assuming that the questions,
complications, and experiences of interiority are identical is a mistake. In place of congruency,
we must assume individuality and difference. Interestingly, Nietzsche’s short parable prompts the
crossing of interior boundaries, I open your lock. There is room left for affecting the other's
internal life without entirely crossing the boundary and claiming the interior as shared. Change,
then, can be moved from the outside. We can see the exterior perspective more clearly in Jacques
Lacan’s essay “On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis” from his seminal
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Écrits. He writes that God—who, for Lacan, represents the absolute and eternal other—“is
incapable of understanding a living man; he grasps him only from the outside (which certainly
seems to be his essential mode); all interiority is closed off to him” (469). In this, Lacan is
describing the place of the other apropos the subject. For God—the ultimate other to the general
subject—all that is comprehensible in man is from the outside, from action and description. This
phenomenon is replicated on the interpersonal level, mirroring the macro level of divine
perspective, in exchanges between individuals—who are both simultaneously in subject/other
relationships—understanding is only available from the perspective of the outside. The interior
remains closed off.
______________________________________________________________________________
A Short Digression On Words
This is a project about how our use of words falls short and deceives us. However, do not
get the wrong impression that its takeaway is the absolute uselessness of words. Words have
more righteous and healthy uses than can count. They can be practical; I could call a friend and
tell them to meet me at Bubby’s at 2. They can be funny; I can pose a knock knock joke that ends
in the words “orange you glad I didn’t say banana?” (to an uproar of laughter, of course). They
can be poetic; I can spin a beautiful metaphor that perfectly describes an autumn day. Yes, in
fact, they can even be emotionally moving; I can eulogize a dear friend and tell a story that
perfectly gestures towards what we all understood his spirit to be. There is no doubt that words
are essential. However, what this project aims to challenge is that words are absolute. There must
be another way to express, something that does more justice to the unparalleled gale of the
personal that language can merely allude to.
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The Entrance Of The Other
We can now proceed with an understanding of the personal and private nature of the
specifics of the interior. That interior, however, is not sealed off from the world. Although it is
essentially unshareable, the interior space is, of course, shaped and affected by the world it exists
within. That fact alone is not of negative consequence. However, when the exterior world
infiltrates the interior, posing as an extension of the self, we run into issues of alienation. It is not
the fact of influence by the outside that is a problem, that would be a myopic and unsteady claim
at best. It is the disguising of other as self that causes us problems. If a friend gives you a good
piece of advice and you listen and change something in your life, that is to be celebrated.
However, if you begin identifying with a representation of your friend that functions as an
internal regime of enforcement that comprises part of the self, then problems arise. I know I am
being vague here, I apologize. Allow me to dive into specifics for assistance in my explanation.
We turn to Nietzsche for assistance in bringing our problem into focus. In the second
essay of On The Genealogy Of Morals, he establishes a model of depth psychology, through the
language of the ‘conscience’ that will shed light on our exploration. When I say ‘depth
psychology,’ I am speaking, quite generally, of a psychological system that acknowledges the
human psyche to contain more than one layer, usually a conscious and an unconscious, or some
form of that distinction. Nietzsche writes of a “sovereign man” who “has his own independent,
protracted will and the right to make promise” and awakes “a proud consciousness, quivering in
every muscle, of what has at length been achieved and become flesh in him, a consciousness of
his own power and freedom, a sensation of mankind come to completion” (59). The sovereign
man has awoken what we call self-consciousness. He has an awareness of, not only the
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environment around him, but of himself and his place within it. The capability to promise is the
capability to hold the self accountable. It is a result of a reflexive consciousness, an awareness
that reflects back upon itself. The psychological development of the sovereign man, it’s worth
noting, is upward. He begins with an unconscious and develops a consciousness. He writes that
this “proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this
rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate” is given a name by the sovereign man, he
“calls it his conscience” (60). The sovereign man, then, is positioned as the one who possesses
the capability to look back upon himself and pass a judgment, through the mechanism named the
conscience. The conscience is an apparatus of reflexive consciousness, a consciousness that
looks upon itself.
The conscience is in contention with the psychological plain that predates the reflexivity
of the sovereign man, for Nietzsche that plain is named ‘instinct.’ The sovereign man comes into
full power when man “found himself finally enclosed within the walls of society and of peace
[and...] suddenly all their instincts were disvalued and suspended” (84). The man finds himself
in a web of connections with others, a society, reverent to the formal wishes of others and
removed from his passive individuality. That new position sees the sovereign man renounce and
repress his instincts, replacing them with this new conscience. He is now submissive to the
codified systems implemented by others to ensure collective normalcy.
The sovereign man is suffering. His ailment Nietzsche names the ‘bad conscience.’ To
Nietzsche, bad conscience is “the most serious illness that man was bound to contract under the
stress of the most fundamental change he ever experienced,” the transition to society (84). Now,
what is this bad conscience that haunts him? We must first understand the process and
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mechanism of general conscience. Conscience seeks to sort action into the discrete categories of
right and wrong. Of course, there is nuance to be had, but, for our purposes, that understanding
will serve us just fine. What belongs in these categories, the business of morality, is not naturally
decided. They are, then, culturally derived. How that goes about happening is the focus of On
The Genealogy Of Morals. The sorting voice of the conscience is a socially created one, it is the
internalization of mass morality.
Our project does not seek to provide close analysis of Nietzsche’s origin of morality, but
we will foray into his origin of conscience. He writes that the conscience emerges from
“relationship between creditor and debtor” (63). This gives us, frankly, very little in terms of
direct causality, but we must look a bit closer and think a bit more creatively. In the preface,
Nietzsche calls for “an art of exegesis” in order to understand the book after all (23). In the
relationship between the creditor and the debtor, what dynamics unfold? He writes that “the
debtor made a contract with the creditor and pledged that if he should fail to repay he would
substitute something else that he ‘possessed,’ something he had control over” (64). The emphasis
on the word ‘possessed,’ and its following loose definition of control, is notable. The stakes of a
contractual-debt relationship are the loss of control, or at least of a portion of control. If the
debtor fails to return the creditors loan, they lose a certain amount of their sovereignty. They
allow the creditor to invade and annex their agency.
Let’s look towards an example. Let’s say Sven lends Melissa 10 bushels of grapes with
the promise that Melissa will pay him when her grapes are ready for harvest. On the most literal
and elementary level, Melissa is now in debt to Sven for the amount of 10 bushels. We need not
concern ourselves with questions of interest here. Nietzsche’s interest in the relationship is not
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clarified from this literal and material understanding; such a thing can be thought of practically,
perhaps Melissa’s grapes are late this year and she needs to borrow Sven’s to feed her kids.
Luckily for us, Nietzsche does not refer to the material relation we refer to as debt, instead he is
interested in the relationship between the creditor and debtor. In other words, he is not focused
on the grapes, he is interested in Melissa and Sven. It is between these two that we can begin to
access the association of debt to the conscience. What Sven has done is not the mere material
practice of giving grapes; no, he has intermingled his and Melissa’s interests and possessions in
such a way that Melissa now occupies a dialectical relationship with Sven. By receiving his
grapes with the contract of a continuing grape-centric relationship, Melissa has taken on Sven’s
interests as her own. They are now bound together in contradictory, but conjoined interest.
Melissa owes, as due to a contract—a sort of third party mediator—a part of her material gain to
Sven in the future. She is, in a certain sense, occupied by Sven’s wishes. Her individual wish
would be to claim her grapes as her own, but the fact of the preexisting relationship to Sven
nessicates that not to be the case. Sven is possessing her mind as a third party looking at her
actions, dictating whether or not they follow the contract she agreed to. In her promise, she not
only signs away her grapes but a part of her self-direction. She allows Sven to monitor and
control her actions. It is this relationship that Nietzsche calls the conscience, the third party
reflexive mediator. Especially important for our investigation, that mediator is the voice of the
other internalized. Melissa’s conscience, as it relates to grapes at least, is not her own voice, it’s
Sven’s.
Here we can come to an understanding of the conscience, and its formation. It is the
internalized voice of the other relaying the obligation an individual has to them or a generalized
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abstracted other. That obligation, at large, is formalized through a society of law that demands a
sublimation of instinct in exchange for the gift of conscience. I am reminded here of W.E.B
DuBois’s illustration of the double consciousness. While we are not working within his specific
terms, it is worthwhile to glance towards him, in order to drive the point home. In his influential
1903 work, The Souls of Black Folk, DuBois famously writes, “the Negro is [...] born with a veil
and gifted with second-sight in this American world,—a world which yields him no true
self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a
peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through
the eyes of others” (38). In his description of the experience of being Black in America, DuBois
offers us an excellent and telling example of the internalization of the other. He describes the
other’s gaze, in this case not merely an other in the fact of their not being of you, but importantly
also other in the ontological identity category they occupy. That gaze is defining; the other
becomes the yardstick by which the individual measures themself. The experience of Blackness
in America, for DuBois, is that of looking back at oneself through the eyes of the white other.
That self-view cements an understanding of self as inferior and, essentially, other to one’s own
self image. Importantly, the other, here, is the oppressive institution of whiteness. Therefore, we
can also understand the work DuBois provides us with as being exemplary of the material danger
of the conscience, as Nietzsche constructs it. Internalizing the moral voice of the other that says,
for example, ‘murder is wrong and you should not do it’ seems to be materially beneficial. It
instructs people not to murder, clearly a social good. However, the voice internalized does not
repeat merely neutral or righteous moral imperatives. It can just as well be the voice of an
oppressor or a different unrighteous and cruel other.
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Through our foray into Nietzsche’s conscience and DuBois’s double consciousness we
may now understand the resulting psychological harm of the internalized voice of the other.
Importantly, by the claiming of the other’s voice, we become alienated from ourselves. In the
addition of the other into our personal matrix, we outsource some of our control over our interior.
We become mixed up in a whirlwind of identification, losing a core of individuality through
which to interact. The other’s voice becomes as loud as our own in personal internal matters.
We will now turn to Jacques Lacan for an account of the internalization of other and its
mechanism. For Lacan, the other becomes internal at ‘the mirror stage,’ the moment an infant,
when looking in a mirror, first recognizes that image as themself. Before that, their relation to
their mirrored image would be the same as a dog’s or another animal’s. At that point, there is no
mechanism by which they are able to connect the image within the mirror back to themself.
Their reflection is alien to them, just in the way that any other person outside of themself is.
However, at a certain point in development the child enters into, what Lacan calls, the mirror
stage. It is at that point that the child looks at the image in the mirror and claims it as their own,
as themself. Importantly, for Lacan, the mirrored image fundamentally remains other to the
child’s subject. It is but a mere surface image, not, in fact, the child. The mirrored reflection still
resides outside of the child’s self and remains alien, but yet the child still identifies with it
anyway. It is at this moment that the child, by claiming other as itself, enters into the
consciousness that internalizes the other. He writes, in the essay “The Mirror Stage as Formative
of the I Function” within Écrits, that the realization of the mirror stages enters a child into a
process of becoming “objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other” (76). When the
child identifies the mirrored image as “me,” they are immediately placed within a dialectical
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relationship between themself and other in which they simultaneously identify with both as the
same. They become aware, not only phenomenologically, but reflexively as well. That is to say,
that they not only experience, but also look back upon that experience. He describes the
realization of the mirror stage as the “moment that decisively tips the whole of human
knowledge into mediatization through the desire of the other” (5). It is the single fulcrum upon
which the internal world becomes subverted and of the other. After this point, no longer are you
for yourself, but you are for the other. The language of “mediatization,” meaning the process by
which media affects other forms of culture, is particularly poignant here. Imagine, say, a
professional athlete giving a post-game interview. The answers they give are, of course, not
genuine to them, but intended to satiate the desires of the ultimate symbolic other, represented by
the media. They are, at that moment, mediatized. However, common understanding is that
mediatization only happens for brief moments. Yes, perhaps the athlete is mediatized in that
interview, but then he goes on to be his own individual, capable of truly personal thought. For
Lacan, the mirror stage makes this untrue. In the moment of the interview, the athlete is
explicitly mediatized, but they then go back and, having internalized the gaze of the other,
maintain this state even privately. The athlete has already identified with the other dialectically
and the other’s desires have insidiously entered their psyche. Finally resulting in the alienation
from self that Nietzsche touches on. That alienation consists of the natural subversion of the
mirror stage. We internalize the gaze of the other within ourselves, making the so-called
sovereign man a perpetual other.
From the moment the image in the mirror becomes identified as “me,” the gaze of the
other is installed into the workings of the inner world. Lost is the absolutely personal nature of
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the infant mind and begun is the alienation wrought by the internalized other. What are the stakes
of that alienation and what are we to do about it in this project? Determining the level of concern
we ought to have about this phenomenon is tricky. In a certain way the alienation is inevitable;
we cannot, presumably, go back and unrecognize ourselves in the mirror after all. However, at
the same time, its dangers and complications are not to be overlooked. This alienation insidiously
changes the very way we interact with the world. We think, not only in our own thoughts, but in
the thoughts of the internalized and imagined other. Our own conceptions of the world, what is
good, bad, right, wrong, desirable, exciting, decent, dreadful, or any other adjective of the type
become mixed up, to some degree, with a collective understanding. While it is true that a degree
of that alienation is a basic fact of human life, particularly of society, as Nietzsche acknowledges,
it does not follow that it must be accepted entirely and uncritically. If we are to accept that the
other’s gaze is within us and there’s no getting it out, we must then ask how can we subdue it?
This project does not seek to entirely answer that question, that would be far too wide in scope.
At this stage, however, it does offer one important link in a chain towards an answer; it begins
with the recognition of the other’s presence. We must know that it is there and holds
psychological sway. If we do not then we claim its thoughts as our own, and we are lost. Our
next step must be in figuring out more specifics; how does the other exhibit itself and how else
does it become internalized?
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The Linguistic Distortion
Proceeding from an understanding of the internalization of the other, we must turn our
focus towards mechanism. I will be arguing that one of the key means by which we identify with
the other is through linguistic channels. When we attempt to speak, that world goes through a
process of transliteration which has the inevitable result of distortion and reduction. This is, in its
purest form, a temporal claim, one that orders events and is, in a certain sense, historical. The
events, in the broadest possible strokes, move as follows: first a feeling internally arises, then we
make linguistic the feeling—this part of the process is internal. Finally, we vocalize the feeling in
order to communicate it to another. I’d like to focus on this moment, the second stage in the
linguistic process: the linguicizing1 of feeling. I will be painting a picture in which, within the
model of linguistics presented, it is at this pivotal second stage that we encounter a distortion, or
depersonalizing, of feeling. We will see through Nietzsche’s pen that the experience of Lacan’s
mirror stage is easily imposed onto language. The personal world of the interior, when
transliterated into language, is shown through the modality of the other. In this chapter, we will
continue to explore that phenomenon, from the angles of the intimate and the philosophical (if
there even is such a distinction to be made).
Let us begin in the personal. Now, if you care to allow me, I wish to share an anecdote
that may enlighten us both. As is often true, an example of distortion is clearest when pushed to
an extreme place, at the liminal fringes of language. Recently, a dear friend of mine lost his
father suddenly and painfully. This person is a friend of ten years, a person whom I have spent
much of my life growing and learning with. His father was a major figure in my life, a man who

1

A word just made up! For the record, meaning to make linguistic.
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helped guide a process of growing into adulthood. There are few people in this world whom I am
more equipped to communicate with and few topics I am more equipped to communicate about.
However, despite that, when I saw my friend I was unable to speak in a way that felt sufficient. It
was not that I did not feel enough, nor that I did not know the situation enough. I can assure you
that was not the case. It was that there are no words that could accurately express my emotion;
pure language simply does not have the capacity to communicate what I felt. I wished to speak in
language, which, as we’ll soon see, reduces my feelings to that of a collective. The feelings
evoked at that extreme were too acutely personal, too intimate, to be accurately generalized. I
spoke in ways that fell short, but, more importantly, I was silent with my friend.

______________________________________________________________________________
A Digression On Speaking And Silence
Is silence the opposite of speaking? It strikes me that the answer may not be so clear, nor
necessarily universal. Perhaps some silence is the opposite of some speaking. Perhaps, as
Nietzsche says in Beyond Good and Evil, “the fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the
faith in opposite values. It has not even occurred to the most cautious among them that one might
have a doubt right here” (10). Maybe there are no such opposites to be found. In a letter to
Heinrich von Stein, Nietzsche writes, of his own “life’s task” that they “may not speak of [it]. Or
rather, being as [they] are, two very different persons, [they] may not even be silent together on
[that] point" (198). Nietzsche poses silence’s relation to speech not as opposite, but as a parallel
alternative. It is unclear whether he considers the two as slightly misaligned synonyms, e.g.
‘hear’ to ‘listen,’ as degrees e.g. ‘run’ to ‘walk,’ or as words that don’t have a referential
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relationship but are related, e.g. ‘eat’ to ‘drink.’ In any case, silence works as a communication,
just not one in the sense we’re used to. In their shared silence, Nietzsche would not have
divulged any specific information nor would von Stein. However, there is something shared,
something about togetherness that still allows a kind of communication. In this tension, we see a
potential for a reorienting of communication. The standard discursive understanding of
communication is limited to a transfer of concrete information. Perhaps Nietzsche is guiding us
towards a more abstract form, one that involves expression and togetherness without any
specifics.
______________________________________________________________________________

Here we turn back to Jacques Lacan for an account of our psyche that establishes a space
that is fundamentally unutterable. Lacan picturizes the psyche as three interlocking rings: The
Symbolic, The Imaginary, and The Real. We will be dealing primarily in The Real, but the three
are interdependent and cannot be severed entirely. Let me be clear, there is no way to work with
these categories that is both concise and entirely specific, Lacan made sure of that. So allow me
to concede and apologize for the fact that this fleshing out will be somewhat cursory, but not
inaccurate. In addition, our use of these categories will be limited; we are not delving into every
aspect of their psychoanalytic importance, but just the ways they lend themselves to this
investigation. I will be quite transparent about which parts I am mobilizing in order to avoid any
confusion or dishonesty. We may begin with the order of The Symbolic. It is here that we are
dealing with linguistics and the more formal ways that we interact with the world. We may use
an example, borrowed from a conversation with Lacanian scholar Dr. Helena Gibbs, that will
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seem jarring, but works quite well to illustrate our point. Let’s take the experience of a survivor
of The Holocaust, liberated from Aushwitz. Their description of the experience of the camp
belongs to The Symbolic order. The act of describing is comprised of the arrangement of
signifiers in order to elucidate what, exactly, occurred within the camp. The Imaginary order
deals in images and sensory information. That is in the realm of the sensuous and emotive. In the
case of our survivor, they could perhaps paint a detailed and exact picture of the camp, a surface
picture working merely with aesthetics, and it would belong to the imaginary order. Now, at this
point, we are granted an image of the camp through The Imaginary and a linguistic and specific
narrative through The Symbolic, yet we have still not dealt with The Real. You would be
forgiven for asking “If we have already covered these seemingly illustrative factors, what, then,
is still up for grabs?” The answer to your question is at once all too simple and, at the same time,
impossible! There is a certain element in our current picture, built through The Symbolic and
The Imaginary, that is not communicated. It is the phenomenological experience that our
survivor undergos at the camp. No matter how much they can describe and illustrate the
circumstance of the camp, the tortures they may have been subjected to, and their daily routine,
there is a dimension that can not be articulated. This dimension is The Real. Lacan, in his only
televised lecture, titled both as “Jacques Lacan: Télévision” and “La Psychanalyse 1 & 2,” opens
by saying “I always speak the truth. Not the whole truth, because there’s no way to say it all.
Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail.” Ah! What poetic language from a man who only
offers us convoluted neologisms and jargon! Our survivor offers us absolute truth (in as much as
their truth is perspectival) when they describe the camps to us. However, their truth is
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incomplete, for it must be! It is lacking in the real! The truth both Lacan and our survivor fail to
speak, The Real, is phenomenological; it is the ineffable.
Lacan’s account of The Real allows us entrance to a particular and unutterable part of
understanding. It carves out a formal space for that which is unable to be moved from its post
within the interior. That formalizing, though, begs the ironic question of what exactly resides
within the order of The Real and why it is designated as such. I refrain from offering a discursive
answer here, for neither I nor Lacan believe one can be with any semblance of accuracy. I offer,
in its place, a return to chapter one and a reminder; that which is purely internal is inextractable.
What, then, is purely internal? We ought to be careful here, for this is messy territory. The
distinction I seek to make, which does not claim to be absolute nor binary, lies within origin.
What we can communicate with a certain degree of accuracy and success originates in exteriority
and passes through the interior, merely as a means of processing. Does that mean that it can be
communicated with complete success? I suspect not. If I point at a cherry and say “that cherry is
red,” there is still no guarantee that the recipient of my observation has the same conception of
red and therefore successfully receives complete and accurate communication, nor have I made
clear what shade of red I speak of. However, we both have an understanding of what the general
meaning of “red” is and can come to a certain agreement on what that implies in a practical
setting. Therefore, our first category, that which can be somewhat communicated, is that which is
analyzed in the interior but originates in the exterior. Our second category begins in the interior,
perhaps in response to external stimuli. Let’s take that same cherry from above, if I eat it I can
describe the taste as “sweet.” My friend will still, to the degree possible, understand what I mean.
However, I cannot articulate the way that that taste makes me, internally, feel. That is because the
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former example, how it tastes, is a description of an exteriority, it still pertains to and is about the
cherry first and how I interact with it, second. The latter, though, is about me. The cherry just
happens to be the catalyst. It is the location of origin of a phenomenon that determines the degree
to which it can be expressed in specific form.

______________________________________________________________________________
A Digression On Style
Nietzsche, in a letter to Erwin Rhodes, speaks of his writing, saying that his “ style is a
dance—a play of symmetries. This enters the very vowels” (221). Is it possible to be liberated
through stylistic means? Nietzsche may be attempting a circumvention of linguistic trappings.
Trying to use poetic language that aspires to beauty in order to weave and dodge past specificity.
If he can, as he tries to, dance with words then perhaps he can dance around the issues of
communication we are detailing, if just some of the way.
______________________________________________________________________________

That begs the question, what is this process that we undergo when we attempt to
linguicize and express our internal world? We will turn back to Nietzsche and a passage from
The Gay Science that will become core to this project. In aphorism 354, Nietzsche takes up the
question of consciousness, by which he means reflexive consciousness, defined as a denotation
of a subject referring back upon itself, and its direct relationship to language. He begins, “the
subtlety and strength of consciousness always were proportionate to a man’s (or animal’s)
capacity for communication” (298). The revelatory nature of this claim is easily missed; the
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origin of our self consciousness, our very awareness of ourselves as individual or subject, is in
response to the ability to communicate. The ability to look back upon ourselves developed in
order to communicate. Without reflexivity, we would not be able to package our experience in a
way that is comprehensible to the other. Nietzsche describes that consciousness further, writing
that “we could think, feel, will, and remember, and we could also “act” in every sense of that
word, and yet none of all this would have to enter our consciousness” (297). Here, Nietzsche is
breaking with a conception of consciousness that is tied to a capacity to action. The doing of a
thing is utterly irrelevant; it is the awareness of one’s self doing so that matters. Following that
logic, awareness of self and action must serve a purpose, that is communication. His argument is
somewhat simple. We become reflexively conscious in order to communicate to others. That is,
we bring our experiences explicitly into our awareness so that it can be actively described to
another. The crossing of the threshold of self, requires self-acknowledgement. The conclusion
drawn, then, is “that consciousness does not really belong to man's individual existence but
rather to his social or herd nature [...] our thoughts themselves are [...] translated back into the
perspective of the herd” (299). Again, the claim here is simple enough. Because our reflexive
consciousness exists for the purpose of allowing communication, it’s mechanistic function is a
transliteration2 of sorts, from the domain of the personal to that of the public. Nietzsche writes of
the result of consciousness’s mechanism that “fundamentally, all our actions are altogether
incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual; there is no doubt of that. But as soon as
we translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be” (299). Here, we come face to
face with the core of our issue: when our interior is transliterated into the modality of

2

Nietzsche uses “translation,” but I choose to use transliteration in its place for the sake of avoiding
linguicizing the internal.
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consciousness, which is thereby the modality of communication, which is, finally, the modality
of the other, it ceases to be so uniquely ours.
Nietzsche comes to a similar conclusion to Lacan, in the mirror stage, regarding this kind
of reflexive consciousness, but he arrives at it from a different route, one that will be of more
direct application to the work that we are doing at present. Nietzsche mobilizes the same central
object, a mirror. He writes, speaking of the unnecessary nature of consciousness, that "the whole
of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in a mirror" (297). Just as Lacan does,
Nietzsche understands self-consciousness to be akin to looking at one's own reflection. Their
claims align; a mirror raised to one’s own actions results in the claiming of the other as one’s self
and vice versa. Where he importantly differs, however, is in the formulation of that mirroring
effect. Rather than being done through a literal mirror and the world of apparences, as it is for
Lacan, Nietzsche understands the mirror to be placed through the fact of communication and,
more specifically, language. Lacan writes in his third seminar, titled The Psychoses, that
“alienation is constitutive of the imaginary order,” that is, the order that deals with images and
senses (146). Nietzsche is then shifting the alienation of the mirror stage from the imaginary into
the symbolic. The very act of linguisizing, of bringing into consciousness, alienates us from our
own action and our own internal world. It takes that which is entirely personal and non linguistic,
and translates it into that which peddles in the herd consciousness. It attempts to make what is
fundamentally and inextricably mine, yours to share.
The argument that I am making may be misunderstood here. One could think “I see, we
are to understand that the problem of this all is that we have a natural inner self and we falsely
transliterate it and become estranged from our true selves.” However, that is not the case. Such
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an argument has a place, perhaps being made by a pure Nietzschean, but that place is not here.
This project is unconcerned with what is true and natural; instead, we must concern ourselves
with phenomenological and perspectival reality, not on any ontological or essentialist basis. You
may respond, “if not for the sake of the true self, then, why is this interior space, which has been
outlined, so important that alienation from it is worthy of such great concern?” In answering this
I come to a crossroads, a point of unsuredness and tension in the work that my reader, observant
as you are, must have picked up on already. Now, a possible answer would be that the interior, or
private, world holds a special significance. Perhaps it is the least corrupted by the non personal.
Perhaps I could just assert that blindly and ask the reader to accept it. However, I will not do
such a thing. This interior, at which our concerns begin, need not hold any special ontological,
metaphysical, or epistemological place at all! Am I saying that it does not hold a place of
particular importance? No! Nor am I saying that it does! The question of the interior’s place in a
psychological hierarchy is one I gleefully decline to answer, for doing so brings us only trouble
and no reward. We do not need to concern ourselves with how important this space and its
contents are. The bedrock assertion of the work, regarding the interior, is that it exists. This is not
a minor nor uncontroversial claim, but that can be the business of the first chapter. Our claim is
not, as some might understand it, that we are being alienated from a particularly important part of
ourselves, or perhaps even the part of ourselves that is truly real. No, we are working with the
argument that, merely, a part of ourselves is being incorrectly communicated and thus estranging
us from it. This part holds equal weight to anything else, but all parts must hold weight! There is
no need for a unique sanctity to grant an aspect-of-self importance. The interior is, simply, one of
our parts and we do not—as it goes—have infinite parts! Linguistic self expression, then, does
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disservice to one of our parts, causing a profound alienation, a disharmony between the interior
and our connections to the world. That disharmony itself is what we are concerned with.

______________________________________________________________________________
A Digression On Language and The Things We Wish To Say
Let us acknowledge and establish a necessary difference. That is the distinction between
words and what they mean. Let me be clear, this is not essentialism in a linguistic form; we are
not dealing with Truths and words that attempt to symbolize them. Instead, we are making a
technical distinction between the thing a word refers to and the word itself. The act of drawing
this particular distinction must be placed in the outstretched hands of phenomenology, therefore
we will amend our distinction from ‘words and what they mean’ to ‘words and what they who
uttered them intended them to mean.’ In doing so, we avoid concerns of truth and lies, veils and
what lies beyond, or the material and ideal, such bickering is best left to the metaphysicians and
philosophers of essence. However, ‘meaning,’ a word I must admit draws me, carries far too
much baggage from philosophers past who used it in ways different than I would ever dream.
Instead, we will borrow from our dear friends the semioticians—Ferdinand de Saussure in
particular—the vocabulary of signifier and signified. Of course, we are not working directly with
semiotics, just borrowing their lingo as it were. Therefore, I must provide my own definitions to
adapt it to our ongoing linguistic project. Language is a signifier. The signifier necessarily holds
no independent traits; it has no substance without a signified. The signified, on the other hand, is
that which the signifier refers to. The signified holds independent traits, but only becomes ‘the
signified’ when entering into a relationship with ‘the signifier.’ Let us take, for example, an
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apple. As I write this I am holding a Jonagold Apple (I work at an apple farm on the weekends, it
is fresh and very delicious). The words I write on this page, ‘Jonagold Apple,’ are the signifier
for the material and non-linguistic actual apple that I hold. The substance of the words ‘Jonagold
Apple’ are entirely dependent on the material reality of Jonagold Apples in general, and, in this
case, the one that I am holding in this moment. The apple I hold, however, is indifferent to the
fact of its signification. It exists independently of language to refer to it. Regardless of the
language, it will continue being, and likely continue to be delicious.
______________________________________________________________________________

Our world is messy. Giving clear cut answers here is a fool’s strategy. Nietzsche himself,
whom we are citing as our primary thinker, complicates our process. In The Gay Science, he
writes “to realize that what things are called is incomparably more important than what they are”
(121). Uh oh! That is not what we wish for him to say… Don’t worry, gullible reader o mine, I
know I had you for a second there, but I’m only kidding. Nietzsche is making a claim here of
weight and complication. It certainly can be read at face value, but I offer a different
understanding. He begins by writing that this fact has given him “the greatest trouble and still
does” (121). The fact of the inversion of importance, from substance to name, is of concern for
Nietzsche; it is a negative turn. We have moved away from the material thing and towards what
it’s called, and particularly what it’s called by others. That name is “almost always wrong and
arbitrary” but “becomes in the end, almost invariably the essence [of the thing] and is effective as
such” (122). The inversion of substance and name leads to a disruption of materiality by that
which is arbitrary and, according to Nietzsche—the great destroyer of binaries— “wrong.” We
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can extrapolate, then, that the insight towards which Nietzsche points us is about the secondary
effects of language. It is not merely used as a tool to approximate something more whole; it
subverts and replaces that holistic substance. In this, we are not only alienated from each other,
but from ourselves as well. The danger becomes not only having you believe that I am merely
‘feeling melancholy,’ as we spoke about in the first chapter, but that I will believe so as well.
Language becomes a mediator of my experience of my own interior. I run the risk of losing
access to the profoundly individual and personal nature of myself and replacing it with symbols
of the collective.
Here we are left with a more complete picture of the linguistic effect. Language and self
consciousness develop in lock step. We become aware of our own psychic activity as much as is
required to repackage it into language and export it to the other. Language, then, becomes the
paradigm of the other. When we speak, we are transliterating our deeply personal interior
experience into a form that makes expression to the other possible. In doing so, we invite the
other into our internal processes, allowing them entrance to our subconscious mind. Speech and
language are riddled with inaccuracy and loss. It is insufficient in the communication it attempts.
Finally, the linguistic world becomes so integrated into psychic experience that it inverts and
replaces degrees of experience. We become alienated from a more whole and pure feeling by
mediating it through the representative of the other. We lose levels of complexity, levels of
wholeness, and, most importantly, it ceases to be so, as Nietzsche puts it, “incomparably
personal, unique and infinitely individual” (299).
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On Connection
It is now, after many pages of writing on the problems of doing so, time that we turn
towards the need to express and connect. Remember, if you will, in the introduction we read an
excerpt from my grandmother's letter. She wrote that she had a “a wordless wild cadence of
music in [her] heart and mind” and yet, despite the self diagnosed impossibility, the language of
the letter “pours and eddies to [her] fingertips.” One of the most tremendous assumptions of this
project is that, in spite of the difficulties of doing so, people, in general, wish deeply to express to
and connect with each other. We must understand both that my grandmother wrote because she
had to express what was within her, and that she wrote in words because she had no other
medium at her disposal. The purpose of this leg of the project is to imagine, very loosely, how a
person could express without language, what a different kind of expression and connection could
look like. As much as I wish this were not the case, we will not solve any problems in the
following pages. The hubris I possess, though sizable, is not great enough to claim that. I hope
that this chapter serves as a spark, for me as much as for you. How can I express myself as
myself for myself to another? How can I bravely take a leap of faith away from the trappings of
the specific and reflexive and into the vague and unsure without fear? The answer does not seem
universal to me. I do not write prescriptively. I implore of the reader for an openness of mind; I
ask you to replace either your “yes” or your “no” with a powerful maybe. Think to yourself, if
only until the next chapter break, “what could it feel like if I expressed this way?” Perhaps you’ll
imagine it as freeing. You could, of course, imagine it feeling horrible. That too is ok! Just hold
this question closely: how could I express without telling how I feel?
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Nietzsche’s great meditation on the nature of connection in The Gay Science, “Over The
Footbridge,” haunts the aspirations of this project. How may we learn to embrace our distance
and use it to connect and love more truly, without the pretense of internal sharing? If we
acknowledge that our use of language alienates us from a part of ourselves in our attempt to
connect, then a very reasonable response is to refrain from connection. However, that is despair
and I shall not stand for it! Nietzsche writes “there was a time in our lives when we were so close
that nothing seemed to obstruct our friendship and brotherhood, and only a small footbridge
separated us” (90). He is gesturing largely towards connection and an extreme example at that, a
situation of such closeness that it appeared as though it was completely unobstructed. However,
we good philosophers know to pay close attention to what is and what merely seems to be.
Nietzsche is guiding us here towards the latter. Yes, these two friends had a connection of such
intensity that they believed that they had total unblocked access to each other, merely a
footbridge in between them. Of course, this is only an appearance, a delusion, what seems to be.
Nietzsche continues that “just as you were about to step on it, I asked you: "Do you want to cross
the footbridge to me?" —Immediately, you did not want to any more; and when I asked you
again, you remained silent” (90). This simple question, with the intention of intimacy, causes a
radical change in their relationship. How is it that such a question could have such an inverse
effect? Nietzsche writes that “since then mountains and torrential rivers and whatever separates
and alienates have been cast between us, and even if we wanted to get together, we couldn't”
(90). The very invitation to cross the boundary between two individuals corrupted their dynamic.
The verbal acknowledgment of removing that distance, in Nietzsche’s own words, alienates the
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two friends from each other. They cannot call out in order to reach each other, and to pretend as
if they can spoils their connection.
Here we must ask of Herr Nietzsche, are you pointing us towards distance as a necessary
part of relationships for its own virtue? Or is distance a given and deceiving ourselves into
believing that it’s a hindrance and, itself, crossable causes us distress? The answer here is
nuanced. To understand, we must look at what it means to cross the footbridge. It does us no
service to consider the footbridge as a metaphysical bridge from your inner life to mine. Doing
so would be a contradiction; bridges are, of course, passable. In fact, that is the defining feature
of a bridge. As we’ve established through the breadth of this work, however, that is a feature
unshared by the interior. Rather, we are dealing with a different aspect of the picture of
connection here, one not unrelated to the divide between the inner and the outer, but not identical
either. It is best to think of the footbridge as a spatial manifestation of a binary of connection,
between the detailed and the genuine. That is, it represents the gap between a gesture from a
distance and specifics from up close.
We run into a beautiful contradiction here. The necessary condition for a crossing of the
footbridge is dissimulation and unspecificity. If we wish to pass across it, we must not speak for
speaking engenders distance. Yet, it seems we cannot be invited to cross the footbridge without
being spoken to. We can look to the previous aphorism, “From A Distance,” for some
clarification. Nietzsche begins by speaking of a mountain which “makes the landscape it
dominates charming and significant in every way” (89). The presence of the mountain makes the
larger circumstance more beautiful. Because we understand that, “we become so unreasonable
and grateful that we suppose that whatever bestows so much charm must also be the most
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charming thing around and we climb the mountain and are disappointed” (89). The story tells
itself here and makes much sense! I write this from Dutchess County, New York, a place with
spectacular views across the Hudson River of The Catskill Mountains. I often admire them from
my distanced perspective. I’ve always been struck by a particular phenomenon on the mountains:
the shadow of clouds. The scale of the dance they perform is enchanting. Now, my friend, I don’t
tell you this just to inform you of my taste in mountain occurrences, however excellent it may be.
I tell you because if I were on the mountain in that shadow of a cloud, I would simply be
experiencing shade! I would lose the perspective that comes with distance and my understanding
would become isolated in its specificity. Nietzsche brings the point home saying that “suddenly,
the mountain itself and the whole landscape around us, below us, have lost their magic. We had
forgotten that some greatness, like some goodness, wants to be beheld only from a distance”
(90). If we wish to experience the whole of the mountain’s beauty, we must resign ourselves to a
loss of the specificity in close contact.
In aphorism 60, Nietzsche imagines “a large sailboat, gliding along as silently as a
ghost;” he wonders if his “happiness itself sit[s] in this quiet place [...] quietly observing, gliding,
floating? As the boat that with its white sails moves like an immense butterfly over the dark sea.
Yes! To move over existence!” (123). Nietzsche is imagining a beauty in being on the outside of
something. He is silently observing, silently taking in the whole of a thing. From his perch atop
the sailboat he gains the distance necessary to understand and admire a holistic beauty. Perhaps
he is missing details, but that is besides the point. What is important is that he has perspective
and distance. He revels in his externality; it is the very thing that grants him the ability to marvel
and find happiness. He would never wish to give it up to be within something.
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Returning to “Over The Footbridge,” Nietzsche finishes the parable writing that “when
you now think of that little footbridge, words fail you and you sob and marvel” (90). The
footbridge cannot be crossed, nor addressed, with words and when we think of such a thing we
have no choice but to simply feel at it. Here we see a completion of a short study of connection
and its necessary components. Intimacy requires distance. If we confuse the intimate with the
unobstructed, then we find ourselves corrupting the connections we hold most dear. We attempt,
with our language, to hold two great communications in hands that can only handle one. We wish
to be holistic and to be specific. Our question then remains, can we cross the footbridge if we
abandon language?
I wish I were able to provide an answer in binary form, a yes or a no. However, our
investigation does not lead us to such a thing. I’ll leave that to the next writer. We are not coming
to a conclusion that is to language as day is to night, rather we seek a dawn. Not a sun risen to its
noon day peak, but the first glimmer of light at the break in the darkness. Our question can be
rephrased in three ways, between which I am unprepared to pick—whether that be for
intellectual precision or perhaps just a cowardice of writing. I will, with great apology, leave the
task of decision up to the reader. First, we may understand our question as ‘can we wordlessly
approach the footbridge?’ Second, it may be ‘can we begin to cross the footbridge?’ Lastly, ‘can
we find ourselves on the other side of the footbridge without intending to have done so?’ I will
not elaborate on the virtues of each individually; I will merely instruct you, the reader, to
continue with whatever question most resonates with you. They are, afterall, incomparably
personal questions.
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______________________________________________________________________________
A Digression On Love
Here, I abandon all pretense of formal philosophy, just for the section. I choose to infuse
it with a dance for my own sake if nobody else’s. Why must we love and not despair? Why must
we connect? Why not, as Zarathustra does, isolate in the cave to find the way forward? What is
the virtue of connecting and of loving? What silly questions to ask! If you were to ask an
unhappy man why he may love his partner he’d certainly answer in discrete lists, hence his
unhappiness! Why must we love? Because we must! Reason has nothing to do with it! I am
reminded of Zizek who, in his titular movie, Zizek!, poses, with no logic but feeling and a
relation to quantum physics, that the fact of the existence of anything at all is a “cosmic
catastrophe” and “that the only way to counter this is to go to the end and assume the mistake,
and we have a name for this. It’s called love.” If the universe is catastrophic, then love is its
answer and its resolution. When I am asked why I love I can lie and say specifics, perhaps
someone’s kindness, the color of their eyes, or their humor, that is usually the intended answer to
that question, is it not? Or I can be honest and say bravely “I do not know! I just know that I
must!”
______________________________________________________________________________
We have established now, throughout the breadth of this work, that we, as people,
experience a fundamental wish to express. That wish is a mysterious thing which I make no
claims to unpack outside of acknowledging its existence. However, the medium we traditionally
have at our disposal for this all important sharing, language, is at best incomplete and, at worst,
corrupting. That corruption comes to us by way of a reflexive consciousness that enters us into a
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dialectical relationship in which we become alienated by identifying with the other. Our concern,
then, of immediate relevance is how to circumvent that reflexivity, how do we express in the
modality of the self? I will offer three case studies that perhaps can get us closer to an answer.
They will be surrealist automatic writing, jazz music, and, finally, a dance form, Contact
Improvisation. We will find, as a common thread, all three examples center around
improvisational practice. The first will explore improvisation as a solitary act, the second
improvisation as group prodigious practice, and the third improvisation as physicalized non
reflexive conversation. Improv, definitionally, carries the particular trait of being
non-premeditated. In its spontaneity, it circumvents a degree of reflexivity. None of these case
studies will make any claim to solve our question, nor will they, in specific, be suggested as
consisting of a move towards a solution. Rather, we will try to understand what it is, exactly,
about each that helps, or restricts, a non reflexive communication. I implore the reader not to
grant too much weight to any of the examples, but, instead, to undergo a process of extraction in
which any helpful information can be gleaned.
In the seminal 1924 writing, The Surrealist Manifesto, Andre Breton defines surrealism
as “pure psychic automatism by which it is intended to express, either verbally or in writing, the
true function of thought. Thought dictated in the absence of all control exerted by reason, and
outside all aesthetic or moral preoccupations” (298). We are granted, here, a quick and easy
connection to our work. Breton supposes a view of the mind, in very much the same fashion we
have, that places human thought as essentially private. However, he presents a teleological view,
that we abstain from, in which thought has a ‘true function.’ We can, however, still identify, in
slightly different terms, with the gist of his argument. For Breton, thoughts are depersonalized by
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their formation apropos reason, aesthetics, and morals. It is fair to suppose here that this
depersonalization occurs for very much the same reason we’ve been working with in regards to
language. Reason, morals, and aesthetics are all, for the surrealists, modalities of collective
thought. Therefore, when thought is formed by these modalities they are not personal, but
collective, and made, for Breton, untrue. The surrealist project, then, is an attempt to reclaim the
personal nature of thought and circumvent the structures that collectivize them. The means by
which they attempted to do so, that we will focus on, is automatic writing.
In her book, Automatic Writing, Anita M Muhl describes the process as writing “as
quickly as possible, attempting to remove conscious control or interest over what was being
written” (2). Here we can recall Nietzsche’s words about consciousness from The Gay Science,
that “our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique. and infinitely individual [...] but
as soon as we translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be” (299). In the
surrealists attempt to circumvent conscious control, they are, more fundamentally, attempting to
retrieve the personal nature of their thoughts. I’d like to examine the key components of the
practice so as to more clearly understand its successes and shortcomings apropos both its goal
and ours. The defining features of automatic writing—its speed, fluidity, and disregard for
aspirations towards narrative, linearity, or any sense at all—are what draw me to it as a potential
framework through which to think. The automatic writer seeks to circumvent the processes that
turn language into specific communication and, thereby, into the terms of the other. In order to
do so, Breton instructs the writer to “write quickly, without any preconceived subject, fast
enough so that you will not remember what you're writing and be tempted to reread what you
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have written” (29-30). Breton is describing an attempt to outrun the internalized other. He leads
the writer to channel the internal by minimizing the space for interference by the external.
Of course, importantly, automatic writing is an expression made of language! The very
thing we have spent 3 chapters critiquing! This certainly is a complicator! What is the purpose of
the language which comprises automatic writing? Is it direct communication? I believe that it is
not. The automatic writer does not discursively tell their feelings, but they arrange language
abstractly. In this, we make room for a use of language that does not engage the estranging
nature of direct language. Although composed of language, automatic writing does not primarily
seek to communicate specifically and literally. It is using language as a medium, rather than its
substance.
Automatic writing raises another important question: what role does solitude play?
Breton believes that the isolated action of writing can bring about an expression that circumvents
reflexivity and the internalized other, but does it, in the process, circumvent the other altogether?
Certainly that is not our goal, we wish to connect! Perhaps it poses a question of order; I can
only connect and express with you once I do the same for myself. That is to say, I cannot
automatically write for you, but I can show it to you once I’m finished and that amounts to a
similar result to immediate sharing. In this system of expression, it may be that the other is only
involved part of the time in a cycling relationship between isolation and togetherness.
Interestingly, that mirrors Zarathustra’s movements for Nietzsche, who rotates between isolation
in a cave atop a mountain and travel, in which he speaks with others and teaches students.
Our next case study of improvisation will be jazz music. Jazz, as opposed to automatic
writing, is made communally among groups of players. Importantly, all active participants, in
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this case musicians, must exhibit a certain degree of competence and fluency within the field in
order to engage. Therefore, it is a practice with prerequisites. One can not, at least in the modern
iteration, simply sit down with an instrument and play jazz. Of course, ‘jazz’ is a broad category,
and I acknowledge it as such. We are speaking of improvised jazz of the American tradition. Jazz
has a historical significance that must be noted in our exploration. In the popular imaginary, with
a good deal of historical accuracy, the origin of jazz is pinpointed to Congo Square in New
Orleans. It was there that, according to historian Dr. Gary A. Donaldson in his book A Window
On Slave Culture: Dances At Congo Square In New Orleans, 1800-1862, “slaves recently from
Africa were allowed to spend Sunday afternoons dancing and singing, and remembering their
African heritage” (63). It is at this site that the celebration and remembrance of an identity, that
has been systematically stripped by the other, forms into what we now know as jazz music. The
other, here, is not an arbitrary representation of a person other than the self. It is the sinister and
cruel other that represents white supremacy, the slave trade, and horrific racialized violence.
Jazz, in its origin, is a response to chattel slavery, the most base and profound oblitaration of self
by and for the other. It is from this origin that it gets its acute power. Jazz, historically, exists as a
reclamation of self in the face of the most literal possible theft.
In its more modern iterations, we can see the evolution of the form and its continued
relevance to our project. For our purposes, we will understand jazz in its most simple and
recognizable form: improvised music, usually played in groups, and deriving from the
African-American compositional tradition. There is much to bicker about in this definition, but it
is loose and will do for our purposes. In performance, the improvisation is key. As with our other
examples, it circumvents reflexivity. However, unlike either of our other examples, jazz has
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necessary conditions to be met before improvisation can begin. Its two conditions (discounting
the obvious instrument possession, group presence, etc.) are structuring compositional elements
and musical fluency. I don’t intend either of those factors to spoil jazz’s relevance to this project
as a non reflexive expressive form; I see them, at worst, as complicators and, at best, as
specifiers. First, let’s examine the component of musical fluency. It suggests a bar for entry; if
someone wants to express through the playing of jazz music, it can’t be done haphazardly. In
doing so, it becomes a partially closed practice, one that requires prerequisites before joining.
Does that mean it is disqualified from our consideration? No! It simply means that the specific
practice cannot be universalised. Not any schlub who buys a saxophone can express with jazz; it
must be done with true intention and follow through. Second, let’s look at the compositional
structures. The standard format for jazz composition is skeletal. It details motifs and checkpoints,
but much of the specifics are left up to the players. The fact of structure informs the way we
think about jazz as a means of extra-linguistic expression. First, we have a temporal element. The
improvisational element of jazz is in touch and correspondence with a previous structural and
reflexive element. That is, the spontaneity of jazz playing is bracketed by the previous and
premeditated work of a composer. It is, at once, improvisational and structured. Those modalities
enter conversation in the final product of playing. A generous reading of its temporality is as an
anchoring to a previous aspect of self. The music is tied referentially to a self that has been
removed. That is given more power when we remember the historical content of identity being
violently removed. Less kindly, we could read it as subverting and corrupting, to some degree,
the non-reflexive elements of playing. The compositional element also importantly raises the
question of subject: whose expression is it? Is it the composers? The players? Some hybrid? It is
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here that it seems to me we reach a critical point for our interest in jazz. It is an expression that
remains individual—composers usually work alone and it’s standard practice for players to solo
at least once per performance—but also functions collectively. There are discreet internal
expressions of individual self and yet there remain seamless communal expressions at the same
time. It seems that, in this way, the structure of jazz is able to, perhaps just partially, erect bridges
while maintaining individual status.
Finally, we move on to Contact Improvisation. Steve Paxton, writing self-referentially, in
Contact Quarterly, the journal of Contact Improvisation, offers this definition of contact in their
4th volume no 2 in 1979: “Contact Improvisation is an evolving system of movement initiated in
1972 by American choreographer Steve Paxton. The improvised dance form is based on the
communication between two moving bodies that are in physical contact and their combined
relationship to the physical laws that govern their motion [...] Contact improvisations are
spontaneous physical dialogues that range from stillness to highly energetic exchange.” We can
take some very particular bits of language from the definition to guide us to what is most alluring
to me about the communication in Contact Improvisation.
Paxton sets up the foundation of the contact project as “communication between two
moving bodies.” From the start we are dealing in terms of communication, it is an act of sharing,
of expressing to each other. That communication is, importantly, between ‘moving bodies.’ It is
done between two entities fundamentally in flux, still in communication, but flexible and
unspecific. The physicality of communication in a shared dance removes the pretense of the
reflexive and of the specific. It reduces the dancers to forms moving with each other. They
reorient towards themselves in shifting relation to the other. He goes on to write of the
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combination of their relationship apropos the laws of physics. Here I’m less interested in the
centering around physics, an important technical aspect of the dance but not so much an
ideological one. I am, however, interested in the language of a ‘combined relationship.’ It seeks
unity and solidarity, but still maintains a certain fundamental distance. They’re combining in
relation to another entity, but are still existing as separate and individual. They are unified at a
distance. Finally, I’d like to mention his closing definitonal remarks on the “spontaneous
physical dialogues.” This seems to be the perfect turn of phrase for what strikes me as relevant
about contact improvisation, why I see it as an excellent case study in a possible communication.
Spontaneity is key. It is purely improvisational, not maintained by an extracorporeal motif like
jazz. It circumvents completely the reflexivity of language and forces dancers to dance with
complete fluency and immediacy. It completes that excellent spontaneity in the context of a
physical dialogue, a conversation without words. While automatic writing is entirely centered
around the self and is a solitary act, Contact centers connection around created points of contact
between two individuals. It allows two people to communicate wordlessly and without specifics,
but to dialogue nonetheless. It is a dialogue that requires a profound improvisational component
and, just as importantly, a point of contact between two bodies in motion. It constructs a silent
bridge, maybe even a footbridge, between the two moving bodies. Perhaps the bridge is
temporary and certainly specifics are unable to traverse it. Yet, there is a bridge where two
become one while remaining two.
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______________________________________________________________________________
A Digression On The Listener
Perhaps what we require is not a change in expression. Perhaps it’s a reorientation in
listening. I wonder if we listen too well, too closely, and too naively. Why must we speak instead
of being silent? Why do we feel discomfort in not knowing? If another tells me their feelings, I
believe them without question. How can a reorientation towards not knowing change our
capacity to connect? Can it bring us closer by smashing the presumption to explicit closeness? If
I, as a listener, can learn to not know with much intention then perhaps the problem can be ended
with quiet and tacit agreement. A silently held hand can mean more than any word ever spoken
or heard; the hands simply must hold each other in an unspoken unison.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Hopefully, after our three case studies, we can start to imagine what non-linguistic,
non-reflexive, non-specific communication could look like. In my thinking, spontaneity plays an
important role. It allows some degree of avoidance of an internalized other. We have also
imagined the virtues, or lack thereof, of degrees of solitude, historical practice, group practice,
and physicality, among others. How, then, can we incorporate those practices into quotidian life?
Surely, I am not advocating for most connecting and life to remain the same with the exception
of the occasional artistic practice of expression! We are not only concerned with the act of
writing, the jazz show, or the Contact jam (as they’re called). We wish to improve the everyday
as well, the intimate moments in which connections are really formed. Our point, then, is not to
prescribe Contact Improvisation, but to ask the question “how can you communicate like a
dancer?” The answer is not obvious, nor will it be provided. However, it’s worth thinking about
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in interactions; how can you speak like an automatic writer? How can you listen and respond like
a jazz player? These are not logical questions, they are imaginative. In fact, the entirety of this
section of the project is a practice of imagination. We are not trying to address any question
beginning with “What is,” whether that be “what is communication by dance?” or “what is a jazz
player saying?” We are speaking towards the question “What could,” “what could a dancing
communication be?” “what could a jazz player say? Yes, we are trying to envision a new
communication, not unpack an old one.
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Closing Words
Where now do we stand? Certainly on unsteady ground. We have toyed with an
understanding of the interior as personal and unshareable. That exploration led us to questions of
the other in the drama of speech and expression. We worked through the implications of the
presence of an internalized other and its mechanisms. Following that, we were guided towards an
understanding of linguistic expression that sees it as alienatory and distorting, finally dropping us
at the questioning towards a new kind of connection and expression. Why, then, do we tread on
unsteady ground? Of course, it is because we have arrived at no answers. That is no issue! As
Nietzsche wrote in Beyond Good And Evil, “there might be a more laudable truthfulness in every
little question mark that you place after your special words and favorite doctrines (and
occasionally after yourself) than in all the solemn gestures and trumps before accusers and law
courts” (36). To find the limit on firmly knowing and acknowledge it as such, instead of pushing
past it to firm up a real truth is to find a more honest truthfulness. It seems that the domain of this
project has a limit and that we have run headlong into it.
Our limit is simple, the matter we seek to take up is entirely personal and can, and for that
matter should, not be solved externally. There is no universality to the answers to our terminal
question of connection. I simply cannot provide a solution that says “you are doing x wrong and
y will fix it.” I can, however, detail for you what lies beyond this project for me.
It continues in a certain resignation. I am, by nature, a nervous person. I wish for
overcommunication at all turns. Fundamentally, I wish to understand and be understood by
others. I don’t mean that in a profound sense, but in a very literal one; I wish to know the
intention of actions and wish others to know mine. That emerges in nervous and tentative
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questions, “are you ok?” “what’s on your mind?” “how do you feel?” asked far past the point of
being thoughtful. I feel discontent with not knowing. In doing so, I push my friends, loved ones,
family, and others I hold dear to, not only the point of annoyance, but into my agenda. I wish to
understand them, even if they wish to remain private or distanced. I am driving them, and
myself, further and further into the terms of the other. I wish for them to be specific, and to open
themselves completely. In a certain way, I am inviting them, imploring with them even, to cross
the footbridge. How may I learn to resign myself into silence and distance? It is not an easy task
I assure you. The first step, however, is clear enough. It requires knowing and identifying the
roots of the linguistic problem appearing in my own desires and actions, a movement towards an
awareness of my wish to cross the footbridge or have it be crossed. The second step, as with all
things at a certain level, is to try.
Now of course you ask, “how does one, or more specifically, how will you try?” You do
not leave me be, my imagined interlocheteur, I was hoping to avoid that particular question!
Frankly, I am unsure of how to answer it. I believe that at the heart of an effort to connect more
is, for me, an effort to give up a certain kind of control and exhibit a certain kind of trust. I read a
Taoist book in a library once when I was about 12, the name of which has always evaded my
searches. There was one phrase that stuck with me. The author, whom I unfortunately cannot
cite, instructed the reader, perhaps intended to be a practicing Taoist instead of a New York child,
to “relinquish your name.” There’s a certain quality about that phrase that resonates with me. It
implores whomever comes across it to let go of a name, that which demarcates the self to the
other. In doing so, they become self for self, not a representation of self for another. In
connection, that process works reciprocally with the other whom one is connecting to. They are
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able to connect with the nameless individual more purely by dropping the pretense of specificity,
of name. I apologize if I’m being loquacious or esoteric or any other adjective you choose, but I
feel I have to circle the point to get anywhere at all. My point is I wish to try a relinquishment of
name in a certain sense, a removal of the pretense of identification for, and therefore with, the
other.
In the act of letting go of some specificity, we are acknowledging what we may already
be aware of: we cannot know everything. As we continue to furiously grasp at the specific, we
are hoping that maybe this time, we’ll be able to cross the footbridge. Of course, we never are
able to and our persistence only moves us further from each other. If we wish to be closer, to
connect more profoundly, we must find ways around the specificity granted by words. We must
imagine another way that is not language and another destination that is not knowing.
In her poem “Hunger,” Susan Griffin, here quoted from the collection Reweaving The
World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism, writes “language is filled/ with words for deprivation/
images so familiar/ it is hard to crack language open/ into that other country/ the country of
being” (97). Here, in the waning pages of this work, we are granted a destination, albeit
aspirational. We wish to ‘crack language open’ into ‘the country of being.’ She asks us to
inquire, as Nagel did at the early stage of the work, what it means to be and, more importantly,
what it means to be something that is not you. She does not simply question, though; she is
leading a reader towards an imagination. She is able to note the many “words for deprivation,”
but implies that those words fall short of illustrating the experience of deprivation, of granting
access to The Real. They point towards ‘the country of being,’ but do not reside nor grant
passage there. The titular word, “hunger,” serves as a perfect example. Descriptions of hunger
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can be understood with clarity, but they do not cross that sacred border. They are not the same as
being hungry. However, Griffin’s language is not final. She does not categorically reject entrance
into the ‘country of being,’ she merely says it is difficult to do through language. She could
easily have written that ‘it is impossible to crack language open,’ but she does not! She leaves
room for hope, room for something closer than a gesture. Although she presents the possibility of
an extension past description, she is not prescriptive. She will not provide a roadmap to the
country of being, nor an instruction manual to breaking language open. In place of answers,
though, she raises a beacon of hope in the form of a period followed by an unstated question.
Although it’s difficult, we can crack language open and enter the country of being. How?
Thank you for sitting with me until this point. In the last section of Beyond Good and
Evil, Nietzsche admits his regret, “alas, what are you after all, my written and painted thoughts”
(296). What, at the end of his project, are his thoughts once manifest? They were once so
“colorful [and] young” but are now “so pathetically decent, so dull” (296). Once they breach the
fence between his mind and his pen they lose their youthful sheen, some of their joy even. Here I
break with Herr Nietzsche. My thoughts are not written on this page, nor painted, nor sung. No,
they live somewhere above, or perhaps below, the page. It is there they dance tantalizingly out of
grasp. I did not write my thoughts. I merely gestured towards them. They do not live on the page;
the page is just a guide towards where they may live. Perhaps they don’t live at all. I certainly
don’t know.
After all of this, where will you be, waiting with outstretched hand?
Warmly,
Isaac Zaslow King
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